Palliser Capital Submits Proposal for LG Chem AGM to Address its Deep Discount and Governance Shortcomings

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LONDON--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Feb 9, 2026--

Palliser Capital (“Palliser”) today announced the submission of a shareholder proposal on 9 February 2026 for consideration at the upcoming Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of LG Chem, LTD (“LG Chem” or the “Company”), scheduled for March 2026. In addition to the proposal, Palliser shared a letter with the Board of Directors of LG Chem outlining how significant governance, transparency and capital allocation shortcomings have led to an erosion of trust among investors and the Company’s persistent and unsustainably large discount to NAV.

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This development follows Palliser’s longstanding efforts to engage with the Company in constructive dialogue on the root causes of its KRW 60 trillion (US$41 billion) value gap, as well as a highly actionable roadmap of measures Palliser has proposed to address LG Chem’s shortcomings. These measures were also outlined in Palliser’s October 2025 LG Chem Value Enhancement Plan, available here.

The proposal aims to provide shareholders with an opportunity to express their views through an open AGM referendum on near-term measures to address LG Chem’s value gap, and to establish a formal board-level mechanism for ongoing feedback. These include:

• An amendment to LG Chem’s Articles of Incorporation (“Articles”) to enable shareholders to propose advisory resolutions at the AGM and at future shareholders’ meetings;
• Advisory recommendations to facilitate (1) routine disclosure of the Company’s discount to NAV, (2) an executive compensation review, focused on the introduction of a stock-based component and additional KPIs such as NAV-discount and Return-on-Equity, and (3) a capital allocation plan update targeting a larger reduction in LG Chem’s stake in LG Energy Solution to below the current 70% target to fund share buybacks; and
• A further amendment of the Articles requiring the appointment of a Lead Independent Director to represent the independent directors and act as a bridge between the Board and the wider shareholder base, aligning governance practices with the recent amendments to the Korean Commercial Code that codify directors’ duties.

Palliser submitted the proposal against the backdrop of Korea’s national policy of normalising capital markets by eliminating the “Korea Discount” through reforms that strengthen shareholder protections and enhance governance. Palliser believes LG Chem has a clear opportunity to lead this effort through the adoption of investor-aligned measures outlined in its proposal.

The full text of Palliser’s letter follows:

10 February 2026

SHAREHOLDER PROPOSAL FOR THE 2026 ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING OF LG CHEM, LTD.1

The Board of Directors (“Board”)
LG Chem, Ltd.
LG Twin Towers, 128, Yeoui-daero, Yeongdeungpo-gu, Seoul

Dear Members of the Board

Introduction

We write on behalf of Palliser Capital Master Fund Ltd and Palliser Capital Centenary Fund I (together with affiliates, “Palliser”, “we”, “us” or “our”). As you know, we continue to be a top-10 shareholder of LG Chem, Ltd. (“LG Chem” or the “Company”), demonstrating our longstanding conviction in the Company.

This letter explains our decision to submit a shareholder proposal (“Proposal”) for the forthcoming 25 th Ordinary General Meeting of Shareholders of LG Chem (“AGM”) in March 2026.

Palliser’s Proposal aims to give shareholders a platform to have their say in a fair and open referendum at the AGM on near-term critical measures to address LG Chem’s persistent and unsustainably large discount to NAV and related governance shortcomings.

It will achieve this by giving shareholders a vote to:

• AMENDLG Chem’s Articles of Incorporation (“Articles”) to enable shareholders holding no less than 0.5% of the Company’s shares 2 for 6 months to propose advisory resolutions at shareholders’ meetings.
• RECOMMENDaction by the Board (if the first resolution passes) to facilitate, in summary:
  • Company discount-to-NAV disclosures on a quarterly basis;
  • An executive compensationreview focusing on the introduction of a stock-based component and additional capital efficiency and valuation KPIs, such as Return-on-Equity and NAV discount, respectively; and
  • A capital allocation plan update targeting a larger reduction in LG Chem’s stake in LG Energy Solution (“LGES”) to below 70% to fundshare buybacks.
• AMENDthe Articles to require the Board to appoint a lead independent director to serve as a representative of the independent directors and act as a bridge between the Board and the wider shareholder base.

A copy of the Proposal itself including the complete text and reasons for the agenda items is enclosed with this letter. Our objective is to promote transparency and offer a platform for shareholders to provide feedback to management on the need for meaningful change at LG Chem.

We look forward to receiving: (i) the Company’s confirmation by no later than the earlier of the date of the notice convening the AGM, or 6:00pm on 19 February 2026 that the requested resolutions have been received and included in the agenda for the AGM; and (ii) the subsequent AGM convocation notice.

Our engagement with the Company

We have been engaging with the Company in a patient and respectful manner for a number of years on the steps required to resolve LG Chem’s persistent underperformance and unprecedented discount of 74% to a sum-of-the-parts valuation of the Company – by far the widest among all Korean conglomerates, with a KRW 60 trillion (US$41 billion) value gap (the “LG Chem Value Gap”). 3

This is an unacceptable situation for a company which has evolved into a central player in the world’s electrification efforts as the most significant non-Chinese battery manufacturer, with an impressive and diversified portfolio of market leading assets. The universally recognised reality is that the market does not properly or accurately credit LG Chem’s very significant stake in LGES, the market value of which dwarfs, by over 3.3x, the entire market value of the Company. The status quo is both illogical and unsustainable, and shareholders struggle to understand why the Company has not taken proactive measures to address it.

To date, we have held 12 separate meetings with Company representatives and submitted no fewer than 8 detailed letters and presentations setting out our comprehensive analysis of the root causes of the LG Chem Value Gap. The key areas we have explored in this context include the erosion of trust in corporate governance at LG Chem, a lack of alignment between management and shareholders, the absence of a return-oriented capital allocation framework, and a lack of action on the LGES stake to unlock latent value for the good of the Company and all its stakeholders.

We have also presented a highly actionable roadmap of effective measures to address these shortcomings (the “LG Chem Value Enhancement Plan”) 4 – one area of note being the utilisation of the LGES stake, including for buybacks-in-kind, to unlock significant value for minority shareholders while simultaneously preserving the LG Group’s see-through ownership in LGES.

Unfortunately, despite this solutions-focused engagement effort geared towards a Company self-help approach, we have repeatedly been denied meetings with the CEO, Chair or any of the independent directors. As one of LG Chem’s largest shareholders, such unresponsiveness has frustrated our ability to advance our dialogue with senior management and prompted our submission of the Proposal for the AGM.

Shared concerns among LG Chem shareholders

The issues outlined above are not unique to Palliser and are echoed by many investors and market participants. Throughout our engagements across a broad range of stakeholders, we have encountered overwhelming support for the LG Chem Value Enhancement Plan, centred on Board enhancement, re-alignment of management compensation, a robust capital allocation policy, utilisation of the LGES stake to fund buybacks, and a longer-term discount management programme. We know many other institutional shareholders have likewise been engaging directly with the Company on these issues.

We initially presented our proposals more widely in October 2025 at the 2025 13D Monitor Active-Passive Investor Summit in New York, a marquee annual event that brings together key investors and market participants across all major global markets. The clear consensus among institutional investors in response and with whom we have subsequently engaged, both foreign and domestic, is that decisive and impactful measures are urgently required to resolve the structural issues underpinning the Company’s valuation discount. As evidenced by investor polls conducted by J.P. Morgan and Metrica Partners, investors also have a clear preference for meaningful and sustained share buybacks (funded through LGES share disposals) as one of the most effective ways for the Company to “value-up” (i.e. improve its share price through a reduction in NAV discount and increase in intrinsic value per share) for the benefit of all shareholders.

Such expectations also sit squarely within and are consistent with the current policy direction in Korea. Recent statements from national leadership have emphasised that the KOSPI 5,000 milestone is not an end point, but rather a process of normalising the capital markets by eliminating the “Korea Discount” through reforms to safeguard shareholder interests and enhance governance. LG Chem has a clear opportunity to be a national champion in this sense given its unique ability and position to lead by example by adopting investor-aligned measures such as the LG Chem Value Enhancement Plan.

Persistent shortcomings and the erosion of shareholder trust

The erosion of shareholder trust in the Company can be traced back to the spin-off and separate listing of LGES between 2020 and 2022 – a decision that inflicted significant losses on existing investors and is now widely regarded as one of the most serious corporate governance failures in modern Korean capital markets. The event also became emblematic of the broader governance concern in Korea around the fair treatment of minority shareholders – investors unaffiliated with the LG Group (mainly through the c.35% stake of LG Corp.) - and helped catalyse the subsequent introduction under the Korean Commercial Code of directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders, including the principle that directors must protect the interests of all shareholders fairly.

In the years since, shareholders have looked for clear evidence that the Company would acknowledge what went wrong, rebuild credibility through greater transparency and engagement, and demonstrate meaningful progress in addressing the factors that continue to drive LG Chem’s valuation discount. Yet, despite the passage of time, management continue to bury their heads in the sand by failing to acknowledge the scale of the problem, deploy effective measures to address it or engage with the market in any meaningful sense.

The result is that LG Chem’s shares have persistently underperformed, in absolute terms and relative to LGES, KOSPI and other relevant benchmarks over every relevant time period in the past decade. Minority shareholders have patiently waited for years for the Company’s stated “medium- to long-term” approach to translate into meaningful improvements in shareholder value, but are still waiting. Despite incubating Korea’s leading EV battery manufacturer and the fourth largest company in the KOSPI index, the LG Chem Value Gap has only grown more severe and the value created has not been reflected in outcomes for LG Chem’s minority shareholders.

Management’s Value-Up Plan – underwhelming and inadequate

Value-up efforts have not meaningfully improved the situation. LG Chem’s Progress Update on the Corporate Value-up Plan in November 2025 (“Plan Update”) does not clearly acknowledge – let alone squarely confront – the reality or severity of the LG Chem Value Gap. In fact, it does not even mention the Company’s share price, notwithstanding this being a significant point of contention for investors. Overall, the Plan Update underwhelmed and disappointed for a host of reasons, as demonstrated by the immediate decline in the Company’s share price on the day of the announcement, in sharp contrast to a broadly stable market and peer group. Reasons for this included the Plan Update:

• representing little meaningful progress on initiatives already outlined earlier in 2025;
• being too high-level and lacking in clear targets, timelines and metrics to facilitate a proper assessment of the Company’s progress on value-up initiatives;
• failing to quantify or acknowledge – let alone stress the importance of addressing – the scale of the Company’s NAV discount;
• providing no transparency on the Company’s cost of capital and no clear indication of how capital allocation decisions (including the consideration of buybacks given current valuation levels) will be assessed within a disciplined, return-oriented framework; and
• containing no details of the Compensation Committee’s mandate, how management incentives will be aligned with shareholder interests, or what specific goals will be set in this regard.

Although the 2025 Q4 earnings presentation on 29 January 2026 offered some additional clarity on utilising the LGES stake, the proposed plan to gradually monetize it down to around 70% over 5 years or so was received very poorly, as evidenced by the steep 9% drop in the Company’s share price on the day. Investors’ primary concern is the decision to return only 10% of the proceeds to shareholders, which materially limits total shareholder return. Investors also question the lack of ambition of the disposal – representing only a small fraction of the overall stake over a long timeline and leaving an inappropriately large holding that continues to trap significant capital despite many valid alternative uses of capital. Further concerns include the paucity of information, including expected returns, on the growth investments that are expected to be funded with the balance of the proceeds.

Moreover, it is inexplicable why, as we saw this year, dividends rather than buybacks appear to be the preferred method for returning proceeds to shareholders. Given the size of LG Chem’s discount to NAV, buybacks offer a unique and compelling opportunity to generate significant long-term value accretion at virtually no risk from a capital allocation perspective – in essence, an opportunity for LG Chem shareholders to increase their effective see-through ownership of LGES on a per share basis at 26 cents on the dollar, sending a strong signal to the market and better positioning LG Chem shareholders to benefit even more from probable future value-upside and dividend payouts from LGES.

Management’s failure to keep pace with Korean peers

If senior management were prepared to be responsive to widespread investor sentiment, the inadequacies of the Company’s value-up programme could have been avoided. Other major Korean conglomerates are certainly doing a much better job of engaging with their shareholders and initiating tangible measures to address the concerns of their stakeholders. We note, for example, focused measures to address the discount to NAV convincingly at SK Square, an embrace of the latest Commercial Code reforms through increased market transparency and enhanced shareholder rights (such as making it easier for shareholders to propose AGM agenda items) at Hanwha Corporation, and performance-linked stock compensation for employees at Samsung Electronics.

Such initiatives have contributed to a notable narrowing of the average NAV discount across Korea’s major conglomerate holding companies 5 – an improvement of roughly 12% since the change of President last year. In contrast, LG Chem’s discount has narrowed by only 3% over the same period and remains the widest among Korean holding companies. It is no surprise that while the KOSPI, the Company’s peers and LGES have all performed well in the year-to-date, the LG Chem share price is down.

Rather concerningly, the Company has informed us that it is inappropriate to assess whether LG Chem’s shares are undervalued by looking at the discount to NAV, and that NAV itself is a highly fluid and subjective measure which cannot be regarded as a fair indicator of value. We respectfully disagree with this view, which is strikingly out-of-touch with the market. The analyst and investor community at large are rightly focused on the unsustainable scale of the LG Chem Value Gap and have no difficulty measuring its size and agreeing that it is a problem. Nor should the company, with any subjectivity concerns addressed by being transparent about the detailed method used to calculate the discount.

Continuing to deny the significance of such a deep and persistent NAV discount makes matters worse and seals the case in our view for shareholders to be canvassed on the need for more transparency and focus on this issue. As things stand, a failure to address the valuation discount and commit to specific targets and timelines for enhancing corporate value has left the Company increasingly out of step with investor expectations and peer momentum, particularly at a time when the Korean market is moving decisively toward more credible value-up standards.

The need to broaden the dialogue and give shareholders a voice

Our intention has always been to work constructively with the Company to improve alignment between management and shareholders and find a credible path forward to unlocking intrinsic value and catalysing growth for the benefit of all LG Chem stakeholders.

At this point, however, it remains unclear whether private engagement alone can advance this outcome. As explained above, we see no signs of tangible progress and it remains challenging to make the case for change when our manifold requests for meetings with the CEO, Chair and independent Board members have been repeatedly declined. Moreover, the Company’s routine unwillingness to confirm in a timely manner that correspondence we were addressing to the Board was being duly circulated to the directors individually has also been a source of great frustration, being the simplest of requests which should not have been controversial at all.

Consequently, our access to the Company has been limited to the CFO and his IR team, despite our being one of LG Chem’s largest shareholders and one that has put forward its views publicly. While the Company has stated that the Board has conducted “due review and deliberation” of our communications and sought independent advice in this regard, there has been no meaningful disclosure of the process followed, the substance of the advice received, or the Board’s evaluation of our proposals and the way in which it has reached its conclusions. This limited access and lack of transparency is difficult to reconcile with the Company’s representation that it is engaging constructively with shareholders – particularly as the feedback we receive from other investors suggests otherwise. This misalignment underscores the need for transparent and orderly mechanisms that allow all shareholders to communicate their views directly, without reliance on selective or opaque channels of engagement.

This is why, most recently, in an effort to remain constructive and work collaboratively with the Company, we suggested that a limited number of practical and non-prescriptive measures to address key Company shortcomings be put to shareholders at the upcoming AGM as Company-proposed agenda items. This shareholder listening exercise was rejected, however, as being impractical and on the purported basis that shareholders have no legal right to vote on the measures in question. We disagree; the Company can always solicit shareholder feedback, including through non-binding resolutions, and should do so – particularly given management’s stance that shareholders have diverse views on the need to address the discount to NAV.

The Proposal therefore reflects our view that the most appropriate way to catalyse positive change at LG Chem is to open the debate to include all shareholders. We believe the appropriate starting point is amendments to the Company’s Articles to (i) enable shareholders of a certain size to propose non-binding advisory resolutions at a shareholders’ meeting, and (ii) require the Board to designate a lead independent director from among the independent directors to act as a bridge between the Board and the wider shareholder base.

Proposed agenda items

Agenda item #1-1: Articles amendment to enable advisory resolutions

The Proposal gives shareholders a vote on amending the Company’s Articles to introduce a mechanism allowing committed significant minority shareholders holding at least 0.5% of the Company’s shares continuously for 6 months to put forward advisory resolutions 6 – both at the AGM and at future shareholders’ meetings.

The ability for shareholders to cast their vote on non-binding proposals is a globally recognised mechanism for providing feedback to boards of directors on critical issues. The importance of this mechanism at LG Chem is amplified because the success of binding resolutions is effectively dependent on a single shareholder’s vote (i.e. LG Corp).

Agenda item #1-1 to 1-4: Advisory Recommendations

If the above vote passes, shareholders would then have a vote on the following agenda items framed as non-binding, advisory resolutions in the form of recommendations to the Board (“Advisory Recommendations”):

• disclosure on a quarterly basis of LG Chem’s NAV discount as a major financial indicator in the Company’s Corporate Value-up Plan and in Corporate Value-up Plan updates;
• a review of the Company’s executive compensation framework to be undertaken by the Compensation Committee, focusing on the introduction of a stock-based component and additional KPIs linked to capital efficiency and valuation measures, such as Return-on-Equity and NAV discount (respectively), with the Compensation Committee required to disclose the findings of its review by 31 December 2026; and
• an update to the Company’s capital allocation plan targeting a further reduction in LG Chem’s stake in LGES to below the current target of 70%, with the additional proceeds used to fund shareholder returns in the form of treasury share buybacks and cancellation and the Company to announce its plan in this regard by 31 December 2026.

The Advisory Recommendations focus on long-term, sustainable, core value-up principles – improving transparency, strengthening shareholder alignment and management accountability, and enhancing capital allocation discipline.

We believe that all shareholders should have a say on these important goals through a vote on the non-binding Advisory Recommendations. This requires the Articles amendment to pass first – a vote that will itself enfranchiseshareholders by allowing them to signal their support for the Advisory Recommendations and, more broadly, for decisive action to narrow the LG Chem Value Gap and strengthen governance.

This will allow shareholders of all types, many of whom lack practical channels to engage directly with the Company but care deeply about corporate value, governance and national efforts to address the Korea Discount (which LG Chem should be leading), to have a means to demonstrate their support to management for these vital value-up principles.

We note that the Advisory Recommendations:

• are framed deliberately to be non-intrusive and non-prescriptive;
• ensure that management retains full discretion over implementation and timing, including how best to advance the underlying objectives within the applicable legal and regulatory framework;
• will not detract from or interfere with important routine Company business at the AGM or give rise to concerns about operational micromanagement moving forward; and
• do not impact the funds earmarked by the Company from its already-announced intention to reduce the LGES stake to around 70% for strengthening the Company’s financial profile (including debt reduction and the protection of its credit rating) and future growth investments.

In short, the Advisory Recommendations offer a collaborative and proportionate way forward: a transparent mechanism that enables all LG Chem shareholders to express their views and provide the Board with clear insight into where investor sentiment genuinely stands on these fundamental issues.

Agenda item #2: Articles amendment to appoint a lead independent director

The Proposal also gives shareholders a second vote to amend the Articles to require the Board to appoint a lead independent director – selected from among the members of the audit committee who are independent directors 7 – to act as the representative of the independent directors and to facilitate a formal channel for Board-level shareholder engagement. A combination of our own unsatisfactory experience of being denied Board-level access at the Company, the widespread sense among shareholders generally that the Company has failed to engage appropriately with them, as well as the clear improvements being made at other major Korean groups to step-up communication initiatives demonstrates a clear need for LG Chem to act in this area.

The lead independent director would be empowered to gather shareholder input on issues (including key capital allocation and shareholder return policies) as well as convene and preside over periodic meetings of the independent directors, consolidate and communicate their views regularly to the Board and management, support the coordination of Board agenda-setting and related processes, and promote adequate and timely information flow to enable independent directors to discharge their duties effectively.

The role is intended to serve as a structured bridge between the Board and the Company’s wider shareholder base, enhancing the protection of shareholder rights and interests and ensuring that the independent directors’ collective judgment and perspectives are meaningfully reflected in Board agenda-setting and deliberations. Ultimately, this enhanced governance mechanism will strengthen Board effectiveness and help the directors fulfil their fiduciary responsibilities, consistent with recent amendments to the Korean Commercial Code codifying directors’ duties to all shareholders.

Next steps

We trust that the Board will recognise the clear benefits for all stakeholders and for the Company itself of our Proposal. Regardless of the outcome, the votes will serve as a referendum of an important stakeholder group on the need for critical measures to ensure the future success of LG Chem and long-term corporate and shareholder value.

Please confirm by no later than the earlier of the date of the notice convening the AGM, or 6:00pm on 19 February 2026 that the items outlined in the Proposal will be added to the AGM agenda. Thereafter, we look forward to receiving the convocation notice and making available further public materials as we approach the AGM to explain our Proposal and its benefits.

In the meantime, we hope to continue our constructive dialogue and remain available to engage with the Company at any time.

Yours faithfully,

For and on behalf of

Palliser Capital (UK) Ltd
Palliser Capital Master Fund Ltd
Palliser Capital Centenary Fund I

By: James Smith
Chief Investment Officer

ENC.

The full copy of Palliser’s shareholder proposal can be found attached in the press release.

About Palliser Capital

Palliser is an alternative investment manager that applies a value-oriented, event-driven philosophy to investing across a range of distinct yet complementary strategies on a global basis with a focus on situations where positive change and value enhancement can be achieved through thoughtful, constructive, and long-term engagement with companies and across a range of different stakeholder groups.

Disclaimer

This press release has been issued by Palliser Capital (UK) Ltd (“Palliser UK”), which is authorised and regulated by the United Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”). Nothing within this press release and letter promotes, or is intended to promote, and may not be construed as promoting, any funds advised directly or indirectly by Palliser UK (the “Palliser Funds”).

The views expressed herein represent the opinions of Palliser UK and its affiliates (collectively, “Palliser”) as of the date hereof. Palliser reserves the right to change or modify any of its opinions expressed herein at any time and for any reason and expressly disclaims any obligation to correct, update or revise the information contained herein or to otherwise provide any additional materials.

This press release and the enclosed letter are for discussion and informational purposes only, and do not constitute (a) an offer or invitation to buy or sell, or a solicitation of an offer to buy or sell, or to otherwise engage in any investment business, or provide or receive any investment services in respect of, any security or other financial instrument and no legal relations shall be created by its issue, (b) a “financial promotion” for the purposes of the UK Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (as amended), (c) “investment advice” as defined by the UK FCA’s Handbook of Rules and Guidance (“FCA Handbook”), (d) “investment research” as defined by the FCA Handbook, or (e) an “investment recommendation” as defined by Regulation (EU) 596/2014 and by Regulation (EU) 596/2014 as it forms part of UK domestic law by virtue of section 3 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (“EUWA 2018”) including as amended by regulations issued under section 8 of EUWA 2018. No information contained herein should be construed as a recommendation by Palliser. This press release and letter is not intended to form the basis of any investment decision or suggest an investment strategy. This press release and letter is not (and may not be construed to be) legal, tax, investment, financial or other advice.

All of the information contained herein is based on publicly available information with respect to LG Chem, Ltd. (the “Company”) and any other company mentioned herein, including public filings and disclosures made by the Company and other sources, as well as Palliser’s analysis of such publicly available information. Any and all market data contained or referred to herein is as of close of trading on the Korean Exchange on 6 February 2026 unless otherwise stated. Palliser has relied upon and assumed, without independent verification, the accuracy and completeness of all data and information available from public sources, and no representation or warranty is made that any such data or information is accurate. Palliser recognises that the Company may possess confidential or otherwise non-public information that could lead it to disagree with Palliser’s views and/or conclusions and that could alter the opinions of Palliser were such information known.

Nothing in this press release and letter is intended to or should be construed as a request to another shareholder to vote in a specific way or a solicitation of proxies with respect to any specific agenda items for the forthcoming AGM of LG Chem. The content of this press release and the enclosed letter is intended solely as an expression of Palliser’s subjective views and does not constitute a solicitation of proxies under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act and related regulations.

No representation, warranty or undertaking, express or implied, is given and no responsibility or liability or duty of care is or will be accepted by Palliser, the Palliser Funds, or any of their respective directors, officers, employees, agents, or advisers (each a “Palliser person”) concerning: (i) the contents of this press release and the enclosed letter, including whether the information and opinions contained herein are accurate, fair, complete or current; (ii) the provision of any further information, whether by way of update to the information and opinions contained herein or otherwise to the recipient after the date hereof; or (iii) that Palliser’s or the Palliser Funds’ investment processes or investment objectives will or are likely to be achieved or successful or that Palliser’s or the Palliser Funds’ investments will make any profit or will not sustain losses. Past performance is not indicative of future results. To the fullest extent permitted by law, none of the Palliser persons will be responsible for any losses, whether direct, indirect or consequential, including loss of profits, damages, costs, claims or expenses relating to or arising from the recipient’s or any person’s reliance on this press release and letter.

Except for the historical information contained herein, the information and opinions included in this press release and the enclosed letter constitute forward-looking statements, including estimates and projections prepared with respect to, among other things, the Company’s anticipated operating performance, the value of the Company’s securities, debt or any related financial instruments that are based upon or relate to the value of securities of the company (collectively, “Company Securities”), general economic and market conditions and other future events. You should be aware that all forward-looking statements, estimates and projections are inherently uncertain and subject to significant economic, competitive, and other uncertainties and contingencies and have been included solely for illustrative purposes. Actual results may differ materially from the estimates, projections or assumptions contained herein due to reasons that may or may not be foreseeable.

No agreement, commitment, understanding or other legal relationship exists or may be deemed to exist between or among Palliser and any other person by virtue of furnishing this press release and the enclosed letter. Palliser is not acting for or on behalf of, and is not providing any advice or service to, any recipient of this press release and letter. Palliser is not responsible to any person for providing advice in relation to the subject matter of this press release and letter. Before determining on any course of action, any recipient should consider any associated risks and consequences and consult with its own independent advisors as it deems necessary.

The Palliser Funds may have a direct or indirect investment in the Company. Palliser therefore has a financial interest in the profitability of the Palliser Funds’ positions in the Company. Accordingly, Palliser may have conflicts of interest and this press release and letter should not be regarded as impartial. Nothing in this press release and letter should be taken as any indication of Palliser’s or the Palliser Funds’ current or future trading or voting intentions which may change at any time.

Palliser intends to review the investments in the Company on a continuing basis and depending upon various factors, including without limitation, the Company’s financial position and strategic direction, the outcome of any discussions with the Company, overall market conditions, other investment opportunities available to Palliser, and the availability of company securities at prices that would make the purchase or sale of Company Securities desirable, Palliser may from time to time (in the open market or in private transactions, including since the inception of the Palliser Funds’ position) buy, sell, cover, hedge or otherwise change the form or substance of any of the Palliser Funds’ investments (including Company Securities) to any degree in any manner permitted by law and expressly disclaims any obligation to notify others of any such changes. Palliser also reserves the right to take any actions with respect to the Palliser Funds’ investments in the Company as it may deem appropriate, including but not limited to, communicating with other investors, shareholders, industry participants, experts and/or relevant parties with respect to any company referred to herein.

Palliser has not sought or obtained consent from any third party to use any statements or information contained herein. Any such statements or information should not be viewed as indicating the support of such third party for the views expressed herein. All trademarks and trade names used herein are the exclusive property of their respective owners.

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SOURCE: Palliser Capital

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PUB: 02/09/2026 05:30 PM/DISC: 02/09/2026 05:30 PM

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